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Abstract
This paper proposes a measure of the intensity of competition in labor
markets on the basis of limited data. Large-scale socioeconomic surveys
often lack detailed information on competitive behavior. It is particu-
larly difficult to determine whether a worker moves between the different
segments of the labor market. Here, the Maximum Entropy principle is
used to make inferences about the unobserved mobility decisions of work-
ers in US household data. A class of models is proposed that reflects
a parsimonious conception of competition in the Smithian tradition, as
well as being consistent with a range of detailed behavioral models. The
Quantal Response Statistical Equilibrium (QRSE) class of models can be
seen to give robust microfoundations to the persistent patterns of wage
inequality among equivalent workers. Furthermore, the QRSE effectively
endogenizes the definition of labor market segments, allowing us to in-
terpret the estimated competition intensities as partial measures of labor
market segmentation. Models of this class generate predictions that cap-
ture between 97.5 and 99.5 percent of the informational content of the
sample wage distributions. In addition to providing a very good fit to the
wage data, the predictions are also consistent with bounded rationality of
workers.
Keywords— Labor market competition, segmented labor markets, job mo-
bility, wage inequality, statistical equilibrium, maximum entropy JEL Codes—
C18, J31, J42, J62
1 Introduction
Labor competition plays a central role in the determination of wages in labor
markets. On the one hand, wage differentials orient the behavior of households
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in terms of job changes, geographical migration, educational investments and
other decisions regarding their labor supply. On the other hand, the cumulative
but unintended effect of these individual behaviors significantly shapes wages
in the different labor markets. However, researchers are generally limited in
their ability to study the interaction between household behaviors and wage
outcomes by the coarse nature of their data. For various reasons, including re-
ducing costs and protecting privacy, large-scale social surveys generally only ask
a small set of questions of their respondents. Statistical agencies have designed
these surveys to capture the current composition and socioeconomic status of
the population, and researchers need to draw inferences about the unobserved
aspects of behavior that are relevant to their work. In the study of labor market
dynamics, interest often centers on the extent to which workers of equivalent
skill are competing with each other. This depends on factors such as informa-
tion limitations, costs of job change and the degree of market segmentation, all
of which are hard to define and measure.
This paper applies a parsimonious model of competition as outlined in
(Scharfenaker and Foley 2017) to the case of labor markets. As shown below,
the model represents what may be called the Smithian conception of competi-
tion. The Smithian model not only provides a very good fit to the wage data,
drawn from the American Community Survey (ACS), it also makes predictions
about the competitive behavior of households. This is interesting for social sci-
entists who generally have to deal with incomplete and noisy data, in particular
with regard to behavioral information. The model proposed here relies on the
Maximum Entropy principle to make such inferences about the relationship be-
tween the observed wages and the unobserved behaviors of households. From
the inferred joint distribution of wages and actions, we can extract readily in-
terpretable measures of the intensity of competition in labor markets. Despite
not having direct observations on behaviors, we can infer both a measure of
the responsiveness of households to wage differentials as well as a measure of
the cumulative impact of households’ actions on wages in different submarkets.
These measures also give an indication of the degree of segmentation in a labor
market, without relying on ex-ante specification of the segments.
The first part of this article discusses the relevant notions of competition
and segmentation of labor markets as well as the problems with operationalizing
these concepts with the incomplete data available to researchers. In the second
part, the Smithian model of labor competition is developed and formally justified
in terms of the statistical equilibrium approach. Finally, we turn to presenting
evidence on the good fit of our model to wage distributions from US census
data. We also use the model to draw inferences about the competitive process
in different labor markets.
2
2 Labor Market Stratification, Competition and
Segmentation
Workers are competing in various ways, including through job mobility and
migration. Exactly which workers are competing with each other is a difficult
empirical question, which this section attempts to clarify from a conceptual
point of view.
At an abstract level, economic theory stipulates the existence of well-defined
“types” of workers who sell a particular kind of labor power acquired by educa-
tion and training, and are the only ones able to do so. Among a given type of
workers labor mobility is thought to instantaneously remove wage differentials,
accounting for any differences in the amenities between jobs. It is clear however
that competition among workers has a dynamic element as well. For instance,
workers in related occupations can compete for the same jobs, accounting for
training costs where appropriate. From the perspective of a given occupation,
such latent competitors constitute a “net employment reserve” (Gleicher and
Stevans 1992) that is activated as market conditions demand it. From the per-
spective of the individual worker, the decision to “change types” and compete in
another occupation resembles an investment decision in human capital, which
is how this problem has been studied in the literature. Over a longer time hori-
zon, human labor is even more fungible (Foley 2014) and perhaps best studied
at demographic timescales (e.g. workers may encourage their offspring to choose
alternative career paths). This fungible character of human labor introduces a
great plasticity to the pool of competing workers, which is also frequently subject
to manipulation by state policies aimed at regulating the labor supply (Brunhoff
1978). We will refer to the differentiation between jobs requiring similar levels
of training and human capital investment as labor market stratification.
In reality however, workers are limited in their access to different jobs by
more or less permanent barriers that go beyond the distinction between labor
market strata. These barriers can take a variety of forms, from informational and
mobility costs to discrimination and legal prohibitions. In a global perspective,
the most fundamental determinants of access to labor markets are citizenship
and immigration laws (Jones 2016). National labor markets themselves are an
abstraction, composed as they are of many smaller regional labor markets di-
vided by geographical and possibly cultural distance. Labor markets are further
divided along persistent lines of race, gender and other ascribed characteristics
of the employees. These social divisions partially isolate some groups of workers
from the competition of others, but they do not eliminate competition among
members of the same group. As a significant share of the literature reviewed
below argues, workers with equivalent observable human capital and workplace
characteristics experience substantial wage differentials, and access to better
and higher paying jobs is effectively rationed. Unless these differentials are all
related to unobserved heterogeneity in workers’ productivity, it may be useful
to think of groups of workers being sorted into different segments or niches of
their labor market stratum.
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2.1 Data Limitations in the Measurement of Segmenta-
tion
Important aspects of worker behavior are unobservable through social surveys,
posing difficulties for the measurement of labor market segmentation. In an ideal
world, labor economists would have access to detailed individual employment
histories as well as associated information about wage levels and full occupa-
tional characteristics for the entire population. This would allow us to observe
most of the competitive behaviors shaping the wage distribution, in particular
any actions that alter the labor supply in particular market segments. Re-
searchers could measure the degree of competitiveness by controlling for all
relevant worker and firm characteristics and attributing any remaining wage
differentials to segmentation.
In practical research, our data are of a much more limited kind. The most de-
tailed individual-level socioeconomic data comes to us in the form of population
censuses and their partial-count survey versions, which give point-in-time snap-
shots of the entire population. Recent work in labor economics has made use
of Linked Employer-Employee Data (LEED) to investigate the role of firm-level
effects on wages (Lane 2009). These data sources have enriched the analysis of
wage inequality considerably by investigating the correlates of firm-level wage
premia and of earnings mobility over time (Card, Heining, and Kline 2013; An-
dersson et al. 2012; Abowd, McKinney, and Zhao 2017). As possible sources
of these inter-firm wage differentials, firm size, level of capital intensity, and
exposure to trade have been proposed (Akerman et al. 2013). Firm-level wage
effects are clearly an important indicator of segmentation, particularly if one is
starting from the presumption that desirable characteristics of jobs are clustered
at the establishment level.
No matter how detailed the survey, there will still be considerable ambiguity
in defining the exact contours of a labor market segment. There is simply no
satisfactory way of accounting for the various spatial, occupational and socio-
cultural dimensions that prevent labor mobility. As an exemplary case, consider
the American Community Survey (ACS) which is used in this paper. This is a
very large source of data and researchers need to restrict the sample in various
ways to focus on the populations of interest, in our case workers engaged in paid
employment. Details on the construction of our sample and the variables used in
this study can be found in appendix A.2. While the ACS is the primary source
for socioeconomic and housing data in the United States, it has very limited
information on behavioral aspects of labor competition such as job changes and
prior employment. More detailed longitudinal surveys on career trajectories ex-
ist, but such studies offer much smaller sample sizes. None of these data sources
offer the type of fine-grained occupational information necessary to define labor
market segments in any unambiguous sense. It is therefore desirable to find
ways of making use of the type of information available in population surveys
and censuses.
Despite the data limitations of the ACS, we will show below how we are
able to draw inferences about the unobserved competitive behaviors shaping
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the wage distribution. The Smithian Quantal Response Statistical Equilibrium
(QRSE) class of models (which will be described in detail later in this paper)
make a small number of theoretically motivated assumptions to generate least-
biased predictions about the joint distribution of actions and wages in a labor
market. Figure 1 shows the result of fitting the Smithian model to the wage
distributions of different labor market strata in the ACS, here defined by the
experience level of workers in years. As can be seen, the predicted curves are all
in very good qualitative agreement with the data. In particular, they are able
to reproduce the positive skew as well as the “fat tail” (when compared to a nor-
mal) of the wage distribution. Formal measures of goodness-of-fit presented in
later sections show that the model predicts the observed distributions remark-
ably well, particularly given that the model is derived in a parsimonious way
from an intuitive principle of inference. The key assumptions of the Smithian
model derive from viewing competition as a negative feedback mechanism. The
following section will describe this vision of competition in more detail.
3 The Smithian Statistical Equilibrium Model of
Competition
The fact of competition as a central organizing principle of capitalist economies
is uncontroversial among economists. There is much less consensus about how
competition should be operationalized to explain observed behaviors and mar-
ket outcomes. Theories in the Walrasian tradition emphasize the inability of
market participants to influence prices as the hallmark of a competitive market.
This is to be ensured by a large number of small agents (relative to the size of
the market) who face no barriers, informational or otherwise, to shifting factors
of production to new employment. Only through the fiction of immediate and
costless possibilities for adjustments by perfectly rational agents can this mod-
eling approach dispense with specifying the social interactions taking place in
market exchanges. The essence of this definition is that agents take prices as
parametrically given in their optimization problem and hence do not need to
worry about the impact of their own or their rivals’ actions on prevailing prices.
This passive view of economic agents is linked to the difficulties of Walrasian
theory to provide robust microdynamics that lead to the equilibrium.
Despite being often presented as the forefathers of Walrasian theory, Adam
Smith and the classical political economists had a rather different vision of the
competitive process. Smith conceived of competition as a turbulent, negative
feedback mechanism which regulates the distribution of prices, wages and profit
rates in an economy (A. Smith 1999; Foley 2006). Independent producers choose
their strategies in light of expected returns, shifting their labor towards sectors in
which they expect higher rates of return. In the process, they expand the supply
of sectoral output, thereby lowering prices and reducing those same returns that
gave rise to the reallocation in the first place. Thus, each agent’s actions have
a non-zero impact on the prevailing prices. In the long-period perspective of
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Figure 1: Wage distributions by labor market experience, pooled 2007-2011
ACS data. Predicted distributions are estimated from the Smithian Quantal
Response Statistical Equilibrium Model.
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the classical political economists, the competitive process leads to a tendential
equalization of the rates of return in the different sectors of production such
that relative prices will reflect the labor content of the commodities (Foley 2014).
This regulatory function of competition is seen as an average long-run tendency,
which is enforced by the perpetual movement of producers between spheres
of production and the ceaseless fluctuation of prices around their respective
“centers of gravity”.
The same principle applies in labor markets, where the commodity ex-
changed is labor power. Sellers of labor power, the households that depend
on wage labor as their source of subsistence, will tend to seek out the market
segments where wages are high and leave segments where wages are low relative
to the effort (broadly defined) required in the job. 1 Buyers’ behavior is diamet-
rically opposite as they seek to reduce their costs of production by hiring cheaper
labor (and implementing labor saving technology). The effects however are the
same in that competition prevents average conditions in different labor mar-
ket segments from deviating too much from each other (Cogliano 2011). At the
same time the competitive movements into and out of different market segments
are historical processes undertaken by real people in a particular institutional
context. As such they never come to rest and the equalization of average con-
ditions is only ever a long-run tendency. In particular, any researcher taking a
snapshot of a labor market is expected to find a (non-degenerate) distribution
of wages and worker behaviors. The statistical signature of the classical concep-
tion of equilibrium is one of dispersion around a well-defined center of gravity,
not a single price which aligns the actions of all agents in the same direction.
3.1 Competition as a Statistical Equilibrium Phenomenon
As discussed above, the Smithian conception of competition is inherently statis-
tical, which requires a different analytical framework than is currently favored
among economists. In the broadly Laplacian approach to scientific inference,
probability distributions are used to describe our knowledge about states of the
world. This knowledge is expressed in probabilities that we assign to different
hypotheses, such as the probability that Mendel’s Laws of Heredity are true or
that the sun will rise again tomorrow. A particular state of the world, given the
truth of a hypothesis, is described by a frequency distribution over outcomes.
In any application of the Laplacian method, the first step is thus to choose
state variables that are sufficient to characterize the system under study. Since
we are interested in the interaction between wages and competitive behavior, a
complete description of a state of the world is captured by the joint frequency
distribution of wages and actions, or f(w, a).
The action variable is understood to encompass a range of behaviors that are
1The use of exchange models for analyzing labor markets can lead to problematic value
judgments, in particular when states of the world are compared in terms of the achieved
levels of utility for different agents. One has to keep in mind that the voluntary character
of exchange is strongly constrained by institutional and historical circumstances beyond an
individual’s control.
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associated with entry and exit into a segment or “niche”. For the purposes of our
model, a labor market segment is defined primarily by the requirement that its
boundaries be small enough that an individual worker’s entry and exit behaviors
have a non-negligible impact on the wages of other workers in the segment. On
the other hand, entry and exit behaviors are understood as actions that respond
to wage signals and that have a non-negligible impact on niche wages.
Despite the apparent circularity of the definition, we can give concrete ex-
amples of entry and exit behavior associated with job changes between or within
firms and industries, as well as geographic mobility as a consequence of such job
changes. The main question is how we should classify workers who are staying in
their current employment. With some effort, the definition of entry and exit can
be broadened to encompass workers staying in their job. For instance, workers
who are looking for other employment and are reducing their commitment to
the current job may be considered to be in the process of exiting. On the other
hand, workers that are acquiring job-specific human capital or are considered
by other employers in the niche to be recruitable candidates for jobs can be
considered to be entering. This limitation to two actions, entering and exiting,
reduces the complexity of the analysis and will be relaxed in future work.
The wage variable requires less discussion. Of course, w is often treated
as a continuous variable even though in practice measurement errors render
differences within a small distance ∆ w imperceptible. Reflecting this data
limitation, wages will be thought of as falling into discrete bins. We will use
the notation f(·) for relative frequency distributions and n = n1, . . . , ns for the
absolute distribution of agents among the bins, so that fi = ni∑
j nj
.
The dependence between wages and actions can be represented by the con-
ditional distributions relating the two variables. As will be discussed below, the
Smithian theory of competition can be decomposed into statements regarding
the effects of actions on wages and of wages on actions. Correspondingly, the
distribution of entry and exit behaviors conditional on wages, f(a|w), expresses
a theory of competitive behavior. In particular, the conditional distribution
f(enter|w) gives the fraction of workers at each wage level that are entering
their labor market segment. On the other hand, the distribution of wages con-
ditional on entry and exit, f(w|a), captures the regulation of market outcomes
by competition. In the subsequent sections we will show how two straightfor-
ward constraints on the conditional distributions suffice to predict the most
likely statistical equilibrium distribution fME(w, a) into which a labor market
experiencing Smithian labor competition will settle.
3.2 The Maximum Entropy Approach to Underdetermined
Inverse Problems
Social survey data contains only very limited information about individual com-
petitive behaviors such as job changes or migration over time, but relatively
good information on current wages. How much can we say about the joint
distribution of wages and entry/exit behavior f(w, a) observing only the wage
8
distribution itself? As Scharfenaker and Foley 2017 note, attempting to draw
these sort of inferences is an underdetermined stochastic inverse problem (Judge
and Mittelhammer 2011). The problem is stochastic and inverse because we use
noisy and indirect observations to draw conclusions about unobserved quanti-
ties (in our case the measures of labor market competitiveness). The problem
is underdetermined because we do not observe some of the variables and hence
have fewer estimating equations than unknowns.
The Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) heuristic gives a principled way of predict-
ing the statistical equilibrium distribution fME(w, a) in the underdetermined
case.2 Intuitively, the principle leads us to make predictions that maximize our
uncertainty (and hence our “unbiasedness”) while still accounting for any prior
knowledge we may have. In the standard language of statistical model building,
MaxEnt models capture the central tendency or “systematic” component of the
data with the knowledge incorporated in the constraints, while the remaining
“random variation” component is maximized. The result of the MaxEnt pro-
gram is a unique likelihood function for the data which has been derived in a
transparent manner.
Shannon showed that entropy is the only measure of uncertainty (and hence
its inverse, information) satisfying a small set of reasonable desiderata, in par-
ticular a consistency property. For instance, absent any information about the
state of the world other than the bounds of the variables of interest, the MaxEnt
principle would predict a joint uniform distribution. This distribution includes
no information beyond the ranges, and is therefore least biased. Additional
available information comes in the form of constraints on the expectation values
for some functions of the frequencies.3
The MaxEnt principle can be justified from information-theoretic consider-
ations, as above, and from combinatorial principles. The combinatorial justi-
fication can be grasped intuitively. At its basis is the familiar urn problem of
sorting N distinguishable balls into s bins (Niven 2005). In the labor market
case, the Nk workers of each type k are sorted into the s bins of the joint dis-
tribution n. Since the number of workers of a given type in a labor market
is often large, there is generally a very large number of permutations among
workers of the same type that lead to the same joint frequency distribution.
From the perspective of the researcher, the identity of the workers is inessential
(and unavailable) since all the socially relevant information has already been
captured in the description of the types. Therefore any microstate that can be
achieved by permuting the identity of different agents of the same type should
be considered equivalent (Foley 1994).
As is well known, the multinomial distribution (1) gives the probability of
observing a distribution n for given prior probabilities q. When the prior prob-
abilities are uniform as we will assume here, i.e. when sorting into all the bins
is equally likely a priori, the distribution is dominated by the weighting factor
2A thorough pedagogical discussion of the Maximum Entropy principle and the inferential
approach underlying this work can be found in Jaynes and Bretthorst 2003; Golan 2017.
3Note that it is possible to generate valid inferences based on constraint values that should
be known, but have not (yet) been obtained experimentally (Caticha and Preuss 2004).
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N !
n1! · · ·ns! . This so-called multiplicity gives greater weight to distributions n
that can be achieved in a greater number of ways.
g(n;N,q) =
N !
n1! · · ·ns!q
n1
1 · · · qnss (1)
A distribution n in which all N balls or workers are sorted in the same
bin has a multiplicity of one and therefore a very small probability. On the
other hand, (1) is maximized by a uniform predicted distribution which can
be achieved in many different ways. A generalization of the Laplacian princi-
ple of insufficient reason suggests that one should predict that distribution n
which has maximum probability, subject to any available information on n. For
convenience in more complicated cases, we may choose to maximize instead a
transformation of (1) which is derived by taking the logarithm and making use
of the Sterling approximation (see appendix A.1). The result is the Shannon
informational entropy (2), here expressed in terms of the relative probabilities
p(x).
S(p) = −
∑
x
p(x)log(p(x)) (2)
By convention, we let 0 · log(0) ≡ 0. In addition to being a more convenient
expression for maximizing the multinomial distribution, the entropy also has
interpretations in information theory as the expected information in bits (or
nats for natural logarithm) from an experiment with N possible outcomes. For
instance, a wage distribution where all workers are concentrated in the same bin
has a very low entropy. In fact, learning the wage of a particular worker in this
case is not surprising at all and describing such an outcome requires 0 bits to
accomplish. The entropy of such a degenerate distribution will therefore be zero
as well, indicating that there is no uncertainty about the outcome. Conversely,
more uniform distributions offer a greater potential for surprisal, or equivalently
represent a state of greater uncertainty. Finding the distribution that can be
achieved in the greatest number of ways by permuting agents of the same type
is therefore equivalent to maximization of uncertainty given the constraints. 4
The MaxEnt principle has been used with considerable success in physics
to derive the results of statistical mechanics (Jaynes 1957). Since it is a gen-
eral principle of inference and not tied to any specific physical interpretation,
MaxEnt has also been applied in a number of other disciplines. Applications
interpret “experimentally reproducible” (Dewar and Porté 2008) frequency dis-
tributions as having the greatest underlying multiplicity. The focus then lies
on identifying the constraints that would have produced the observed MaxEnt
distribution. Exploratory statistical work in economics has described the dis-
tribution of incomes (Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2000; Schneider 2015), profit
rates (Scharfenaker and Semieniuk 2016), wealth (Milaković 2001) and Tobin’s
q (Scharfenaker and Santos 2015) as MaxEnt distributions.
4Shannon’s measure is part of a larger family of entropies, which arise from alternative
axioms about the desired additivity and independence properties.
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3.3 Smithian Constraints to the Maximum Entropy Pro-
gram
Having satisfied ourselves that the problem we would like to solve can be ap-
proached using MaxEnt methods, we might begin by seeking the joint frequency
distribution f(a,w) which maximizes the entropy (3)
max
({f(a,w)≥0})
−
∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(a,w)log(f(a,w)) dw (3)
subject to only two constraints. The normalization constraint (4) ensures
that the predicted joint distribution is a true probability distribution in that
it sums up to 1 (we also constrain the components to be non-negative). We
further constrain the average wage (5), either because labor markets clear in
a statistical sense (Foley 1996) or because we recognize it as a well observed
quantity in the sense of Dewar and Porté 2008.∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(a,w) dw = 1 (4)
∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(a,w)w dw = w¯ (5)
The solution to this problem is the maximum entropy distribution (6) (see
appendix A.1 for derivations of this and other results).
fME(w, a) =
e−γwˆ ∞
w=0
e−γw dw
(6)
Here the predicted distribution is exponential in the wage and the action
variable a does not appear. So far, we have specified nothing about the rela-
tionship between wages and actions, and the MaxEnt method faithfully reports
back to us that the two are uncorrelated. Since the constraints give no infor-
mation about the frequencies with which the actions are chosen, the solution
is a uniform distribution of entry conditional on wages. Similarly, the wages of
entrants and leavers both follow the same exponential distribution.
It is at this stage that the Smithian theory becomes relevant. In an appli-
cation to the distribution of profit rates, Scharfenaker and Foley 2017 develop
a parsimonious account of the competitive process in the tradition of Smith
and the classical political economists, which we will adapt here for the purposes
of labor competition. The Smithian hypothesis of competition as a negative
feedback process can be expressed in terms of two constraints on the MaxEnt
program. The first constraint captures the regulating effect of competition on
wage differentials in the economy. We expect that the average wage of entrants
exceeds the average wage of leavers, since it is in response to the wage differ-
entials that workers change their jobs. However, the cumulative effect of this
competitive behavior is to put downward pressure on the wage in the target
11
niche. We express this effect by constraining the difference between the ex-
pected wage of entrants and expected wage of leavers to be no greater than a
certain positive value δ (for mathematical convenience, we weight the expected
values by the population shares):
f(enter)E(w|enter)− f(exit)E(w|exit) ≤ δ (7)
Entrants are concentrated in labor market segments where wages tend to
be above average, but their very act of entry places a downward pressure on
wages back towards the average. Symmetrically, leavers are concentrated in
labor market segments with lower wages, but the act of leaving introduces a
lower bound in the deviation from the mean. This constraint will be binding in
equilibrium, since the entropy maximization would place the conditional distri-
butions f(w|enter) and f(w|exit) as far apart as possible to generate as uniform
a marginal distribution f(w) as is possible given the remaining constraints.
The second substantive constraint used by Scharfenaker and Foley 2017 spec-
ifies that the frequency of entry is increasing in the payoff level. As physical
systems, humans are subject to description in terms of probability distributions
and the laws of consistency that govern their use (Wolpert and Bono 2015).
Unlike the particles of statistical mechanics however, humans act purposefully
within social systems of other purposeful actors. We therefore specify a payoff
function u(w, a), identical for agents of the same type, which represents the
goal of the agent to find higher wage employment. Even if the payoffs are not
observed, we can stipulate that an average utility level could theoretically be
known. Beyond this structure of payoffs, we as researchers have no additional
knowledge about the cognitive process of the agent. Given the constraint on the
expected value as well as the support of the distribution, the MaxEnt principle
tells us to predict a distribution over the two strategies that is of the Boltzmann
form, as we have seen above.
For economists, an alternative derivation which is mathematically dual to the
first approach may be more insightful. It starts with the typical agent’s decision
problem of choosing an action conditional on wages, which is here taking the
form of a mixed strategy f(a|w). Agents choose their strategy to maximize the
expected payoff (8), subject to a minimum entropy constraint.
max
({f(a|w)≥0})
∑
a
f(a|w)u(w, a) (8)
such that ∑
a
f(a|w) = 1 (9)
and
−
∑
a
f(a|w)log(f(a|w)) ≥ Smin (10)
12
The minimum entropy constraint (10) represents limits on the responsive-
ness of the agent to wage differentials, due to bounded rationality in the face of
uncertainty, mobility costs or any of the other impediments to the free mobility
of labor discussed above. In its absence, the response of the agent would be
concentrated at the payoff maximizing strategy. This situation of perfect ra-
tionality corresponds to the thermodynamic case of a system at zero absolute
temperature. In the general case, there are limits to the information processing
capabilities of the agents that introduce a non-zero lower bound to the entropy
of the mixed strategy Smin > 0.
In order to implement this program, we will have to specify the payoff func-
tion u(a,w) in more detail. A simple approach sees the payoff of entry to be
increasing in the difference between the obtained wage and a representative wage
of a reference group denoted by µ. Thus, the payoff is uentry(w, µ) = w − µ.
With this specification, the MaxEnt program (8) yields the prediction that the
conditional frequency of entry takes the Boltzmann form (11).
fME(enter|w;T, µ) = e
1
T (w−µ)
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
(11)
Equation 11 predicts that the conditional distribution of entry takes the
well-known logit quantal response form (Manski and McFadden 1981; McKelvey
and Palfrey 1995). Note however that we did not make any assumption about
the distribution of the deviations from rationality. Instead we used the MaxEnt
heuristic to predict behavior under a very general bounded rationality constraint
(Wolpert 2006; Wolpert, Harré, et al. 2012; Matějka and McKay 2015). Like any
Lagrangian multiplier, 1T has the interpretation of the shadow price of relaxing
the constraint. Here this would be the payoff gain from relaxing the entropy
constraint at the margin, so that larger values of T correspond to greater levels
of irrationality. In analogy with thermodynamics, T is also referred to as the
behavioral temperature. As the minimum entropy constraint tends towards
zero, the behavioral temperature also approaches absolute zero. In this case,
(11) approaches a step-function which has all agents instantaneously switching
to the payoff-maximizing strategy with no room for uncertainty on the part of
the agents.
3.4 Predictions of the Smithian Quantal Response Statis-
tical Equilibrium Model of Competition
The MaxEnt solution to the QRSE model, derived in appendix A.1, takes the
form of a joint distribution over wages and actions fME(w, a). The central result
however is the predicted marginal wage distribution
fME(w; θ) =
eS(f(a|w))e−β(tanh(
w−µ
2T )w)ˆ ∞
w=0
eS(f(a|w))e−β(tanh(
w−µ
2T )w) dw
(12)
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where θ = (T, β, µ). From Equation 12, the predicted joint distribution
fME(w, a) as well as any conditional distributions of interest follow from the
rules of probability. In particular, we obtain the wage distributions conditional
on entry and exit by multplying with the predicted frequency of entry Equa-
tion 11:
fME(w|entry; θ) = fME(w)fME(entry|w)
fME(entry)
(13)
fME(w|exit; θ) = fME(w)(1− fME(entry|w))
(1− fME(entry)) (14)
We will discuss the interpretation of the model parameter in the context of
labor market segmentation in greater detail below.
4 Recovering Estimates of the Intensity of Com-
petition
Estimating the parameters of the QRSE model from the wage data is now no
longer an underdetermined problem because we have inferred the conditional
distributions linking observed wages and unobserved actions. Instead we are
confronted with the usual problem of statistical inference, namely recovering
the unobserved parameter values from indirect and noisy observations on wages.
Recovering these estimates can be accomplished using maximum likelihood or
Bayesian approaches to inference.
4.1 Likelihood Interpretation of the Minimum Relative
Entropy
The main conceptual difficulty is in understanding that the predicted marginal
wage distribution fME(w; θ) can be interpreted as the kernel of a multinomial
likelihood (1). Together with the normalizing multiplicity factor it specifies
the probability of different frequency distributions n over the wage bins. The
value of the multinomial distribution g(f(w);N, fME(w; θ)) can therefore be
interpreted as the probability of observing a wage distribution f(w) given that
the wage data were generated by the Smithian model with parameter values (θ)
for a market with N workers.
As in the discussion of the MaxEnt principle, we can choose a more conve-
nient approximate form of the multinomial likelihood. In particular, it can be
shown that the multinomial log-likelihood per worker is equal to the negative
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (see appendix A.1). The KL divergence (15)
is a directed measure of distance between probability distributions.
DKL(p||q) = −
∑
x
p(x)log
(
p(x)
q(x)
)
(15)
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where we define 0 · log(0) ≡ 0. The KL divergence is also referred to
as the relative entropy, since for a uniform reference distribution q, (15) re-
duces to the Shannon entropy (2). Therefore minimizing the KL divergence
DKL(f(w)||fME(w; θ)) is equivalent to maximizing the multinomial likelihood
g(f(w);N, fME(w; θ)) (Shlens 2014; Niven 2005). For DKL(p||q) = 0, the aver-
age likelihood is equal to 1, whereas it tends to 0 as DKL(p||q) −→∞. Because
of the interpretation of the KL divergence as the relative entropy, the marginal
wage distribution implied by the maximum likelihood parameter values mini-
mizes the information lost by using the predictions of the Smithian model instead
of the observed wage distribution.
The approach taken in this study is to maximize the posterior probability
distribution p(θ|w) of the model parameters in light of the observed wage data.
For the parameters µ and β, we assume uninformative uniform prior distribu-
tions. The behavioral temperature T is bounded below by 0, so we use an
exponential prior. Given the large sample size, the likelihood vastly dominates
the posterior distribution and the priors have only minimal influence.
Further details on the numerical methods used for estimation can be found
in appendix A.1.
4.2 Assessing the Fit of the Smithian Model
We are now able to make sense of the evidence presented above about the
fit of the Smithian model to the wage data. We have already shown visually
in Figure 1 that the observed wage distributions f(w) are closely matched by
the fitted distribution fˆMAP (w). An alternative way of displaying the data
is on a log-linear plot, which shows exponential relationships as straight lines.
Furthermore, double exponential (or Laplace) distributions would fall in a tent-
like fashion on such plots. As Figure 2 shows, the observed distributions in
fact take on a tent-like shape but with a significant “dome” around the most
common (or modal) wage. In other words, the frequency is not decreasing as
fast as would be expected from a double-exponential distribution when moving
away from the mode. The Smithian model is capable of fitting this feature
of the data. Significantly, the Smithian model is also able to account for the
drop-off in observed frequencies at low wages. This feature of wage distributions
is interpreted in this model as the outcome of competitive exit from low-wage
labor market segments.
There are some limits to the fit of this model in the upper tail of the dis-
tribution that can give us indications about missing constraints operating on
processes in the labor market. It is important to note however that the logarith-
mic scale emphasizes deviations in the extremes of the distribution, where there
are only very few observations. Mostly this concerns respondents with weekly
labor incomes above USD 3’000, which excludes the bulk of workers in the US
economy.
A useful transformation of the KL divergence is the Informational Distin-
guishibility measure (Soofi, Ebrahimi, and Habibullah 1995), ID(p, q) = 1 −
e−DKL(p||q). It ranges between 0 and 1 where values close to 0 indicate that the
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Figure 2: Observed and estimated marginal wage distributions by labor market
experience, pooled 2007-2011 ACS data, on a log-linear scale. Predicted distri-
butions are estimated from the Smithian Quantal Response Statistical Equilib-
rium Model.
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Experience Soofi’s ID βˆ µˆ Tˆ δˆ
(1-5) 0.018 1.3E-03 691 243 488
(6-10) 0.013 9.7E-04 858 271 667
(11-15) 0.026 7.9E-04 956 273 801
(16-20) 0.028 7.3E-04 988 282 842
(21-25) 0.030 7.1E-04 1005 283 860
(26-30) 0.029 7.1E-04 1029 287 852
(31-35) 0.028 7.4E-04 1023 295 822
(36-40) 0.026 8.2E-04 930 281 768
Table 1: Maximum a-posteriori estimates of the model parameters and Soofi’s
Informational Distinguishability statistic for the Smithian Quantal Response
Statistical Equilibrium Model, fitted to the wage distributions by labor market
experience, pooled 2007-2011 ACS data.
two distributions (p, q) are not distinguishable. Table 1 presents ID(f(w), fˆMAP (w))
as a measure of the goodness-of-fit of the Smithian model for the different la-
bor market strata. Overall the ID statistics are low, indicating a very good fit
to the data. Clearly the best correspondence with the Smithian model occurs
for recent labor market entrants with between 10 or fewer years of experience,
where the model accounts for around 98% of the information contained in the
wage distribution. With increasing labor market experience, the impact of other
factors is likely to accumulate and lead to a decrease in the predictive ability of
the model. However, the loss in information from using the Smithian model to
approximate the observed wage distributions remains limited to at most 3.2%.
4.3 Measuring the Intensity of Competition Implied by
Smithian Competition
The Smithian quantal response statistical equilibrium model proposed here gen-
erates predictions not only of the marginal wage distribution f(w) but also of
the conditional distributions f(a|w) and f(w|a). While the model predicted
that the responses of entry to wage differentials will be of the logit quantal re-
sponse form, we can now learn about the estimated steepness of the logit curve,
for which Tˆ−1 helps us find an upper bound. This parameter is a measure of
workers’ sensitivity to wage differentials. Furthermore, we have only specified
that wages of those entering or leaving their labor market segment differ on
average by a certain value. In addition to the estimate of this value, δˆ, we
are now able to give an estimate of the entire wage distribution of each group.
Together, (Tˆ , δˆ) give a comprehensive picture of the intensity of competition on
the basis of incomplete data. We also discuss the interpretation of the remaining
parameters, (βˆ, µˆ).
First, we turn to the implied behavioral responses in the different labor mar-
ket strata. Figure 3 shows the predicted frequencies of entry and exit conditional
on the wage, this time estimated from the observed wage distribution. Since
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the two actions entry and exit are complementary, we can deduce the predicted
conditional frequency of exit as 1 − f(enter|w). The two curves cross at the
reference wage level µ. At this wage, the typical worker is just indifferent be-
tween entering and leaving a particular labor market segment. In general, µ
will be different from the average wage and other wage levels commonly chosen
to represent a group’s typical wage. For wages close to 0, the model predicts
that nearly all agents will choose to exit their labor market segment. On the
other hand, for weekly wages above US$ 2000, entry will be the nearly universal
response. For workers with little labor market experience, this change in pre-
dicted probabilities is more rapid and a weekly wage of US$ 1000 is sufficient
to induce entry for about 75% of workers.
In addition to a graphical analysis of the predicted frequencies, we can use
the estimated behavioral temperature Tˆ as an index of the degree of behavioral
response. From logistic regressions, readers may be familiar with the interpre-
tation of the estimated coefficient Tˆ−1 as the predicted change in the log odds
for a unit change in the payoff to entry. Since log odds are not easily inter-
pretable, we instead define two related measures of behavioral responsiveness.
Note that the logistic curve is steepest near wages close to the reference wage
where the predicted frequency is e
0
Tˆ
1+e
0
Tˆ
= 0.5. At this point, the derivative of
the logistic function equals 1
4·Tˆ which corresponds to the maximum increase
in the predicted frequency of entry for a USD1 increase in the weekly wage.
Second, we can easily find the range of wages in which P% of workers change
their stance between exit and entry into a market segment. We define the “p-th
sensitive range” as µ± Tˆ log( P1−P ).
Table 1 shows that the least experienced group has the lowest behavioral
temperature, so that for wages near the mode, a US$ 100 increase in the wage
leads to an increase in the predicted probability of entry of 10 percentage points.
This value decreases for more experienced worker and plateaus around 8 percent-
age points. It is not surprising to find the greatest responsiveness to wage differ-
entials among least experienced workers who likely have the highest propensity
for job change due to life-cycle events such as school completion and marriage.
Correspondingly, more experienced workers have fewer opportunities for job
change due to increasing fixed costs of moving (home ownership, schooling of
children) and the declining expected lifetime benefit of mobility as on-the-job
experience is accumulated.
The second inference that the model allows us to draw is with respect to the
conditional wage distributions of entrants and leavers (Figure 4). The shape
of these two distributions was not specified in advance, only their means were
constrained to be different by an unknown amount δ. Without this constraint,
the MaxEnt program would have placed the two distributions as far apart as
possible to generate as uniform a joint distribution as possible. However, com-
petition limits the extent to which market segments dominated by entry can
exceed the segments dominated by exit. Consequently, the mass of the wage
distribution for leavers is below that of entrants. As a second measure of labor
market segmentation, we propose the estimated difference in weekly wages be-
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Figure 3: Frequencies of entry conditional on wages estimated from the Smithian
Quantal Response Statistical EquilibriumModel, fitted to the wage distributions
by labor market experience, pooled 2007-2011 ACS data.
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tween entrants and leavers δˆ. This difference is a measure of the effectiveness of
competition at enforcing wage equalization across labor market segments.
In general, the lower the estimated behavioral temperature in an experience
group, the closer also the two conditional wage distributions. Table 1 indicates
that there is such a positive correlation between the behavioral temperature
T and the degree of negative feedback δ. This relationship between the pa-
rameters is in fact a logical consequence of the Smithian model. Smaller gaps
between the average conditions of entrants and leavers indicate a greater degree
of competitiveness, which needs to be sustained by more vigorous competitive
behavior.
Thus, we can give intuitive interpretations to the estimated quantities (Tˆ , µˆ, δˆ).
The parameter β represents an entropy price of the difference between the
weighted expected wages conditional on entry and exit. As in any Lagrange
multiplier problem, β is interpretable as the marginal effect of relaxing the con-
straint on the objective. In this case, the parameter represents the increase in
the entropy of the marginal wage distribution (measured in nats) for a small
increase in the difference between the expected wages of entrants and leavers.
5 Discussion
The model presented in this paper speaks primarily to the literature on labor
market competition and market clearing. In the Smithian Quantal Response
Statistical Equilibrium model, the situation of perfect competition with a unique
wage for all workers of the same type is a degenerate and extremely unlikely
case. Our model is therefore related to the literature on “segmented” labor
markets. These studies account for wage differentials not predicted by human
capital or other observable characteristics by arguing for the existence of at least
two functionally distinct market segments (Dickens and Lang 1993).
There is significant disagreement as to the mechanisms of this segmentation.
From a political economy perspective, Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 1973 argue
that workers in the primary segment are shielded from competition by workers
in the secondary segment due to employer efforts to divide the work force along
social identity lines and undermine solidarity. Privileged groups in the primary
segment may also actively try to restrict access to outsiders through closed-shop
union policies and similar efforts. The degree of labor market segmentation then
has important implications for the formation and stability of worker coalitions.
Alternatively, an efficiency wage or labor discipline approach (Shapiro and
Stiglitz 1984; Bowles and Gintis 1990) would relate the segmentation to differ-
ences in the incompleteness of wage contracts, perhaps due to greater degrees
of autonomy in primary occupations. If effort is harder to ascertain in some
occupations, employers would find it profitable to pay wages above the market
clearing level, thereby rationing jobs in this segment. Similarly the available
pool of unemployed workers may be greater for some job categories than for
others, leading to lower wages in those segments. Thus in addition to affect-
ing the average bargaining power of workers, the threat of unemployment may
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the Smithian Quantal Response Statistical Equilibrium Model. Fitted to the
wage distributions by labor market experience, pooled 2007-2011 ACS data.
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be particularly effective at preventing wage increases in low-wage sectors by
discouraging the out-mobility of workers (Botwinick 1993).
The Smithian QRSE model is agnostic with respect to the precise mecha-
nisms of segmentation, but it insists on some degree of wage inequality even
among completely homogeneous agents. This inequality is the result of the nor-
mal operation of a labor market with non-zero behavioral temperature, which
means conversely that there will be a degree of segmentation in all labor mar-
kets. The empirical literature on segmented labor markets either specifies the
boundaries of the segments by occupation or industry, or uses switching models
(Dickens and Lang 1985) to determine membership in segments endogenously
from the data. Our model is more flexible than these approaches by giving
up on the precise specification of labor market segments in favor of a simple
measure of segmentation for the market as a whole. More fundamentally, any
of the models of segmentation discussed above are in fact encompassed by the
Smithian QRSE class of models. All that is required by the QRSE model is
that labor mobility imposes some limits on the differential bargaining power of
workers.
The statistical equilibrium approach adopted in our model deals effectively
with more general conceptual problems related to representing the competitive
process. Most empirical labor market studies are based implicitly on the Wal-
rasian paradigm, in which the degree of competition in a market is a function
primarily of the number of agents. In the model presented here, the level of
competition is independent of the population size, or is an intensive property of
the system. Equilibrium concepts such as those of Walras or Nash are absolute
rest points at which no individual has an incentive to change their strategy. Sta-
tistical mechanics, which has been developed to reconcile an atomic theory of
matter with the phenomenological results of thermodynamics, provides a differ-
ent type of equilibrium concept. Statistical equilibrium is inherently compatible
with, and indeed enforced by, continuous fluctuation at the microscopic level.
Unlike the traditional equilibrium concepts, statistical equilibrium descriptions
do not attempt to keep track of individual trading histories of each agent.5 By
giving up the attempt at modeling each individual’s economic fate, the statis-
tical equilibrium approach gains robustness and a built-in ability to deal with
microscopic dynamics.
The QRSE model developed in this study is also related to the field of econo-
physics. This literature has developed a number of insightful analogies between
economic phenomena and the statistical mechanics of particles. Noticing the
5In fact, it is in part the attempt to track individual trading histories from an endowment
point to the market equilibrium that has generated many of the pitfalls of Walrasian theory.
The need for a mythical “auctioneer” who checks individuals’ excess demands but allows
trade only at the equilibrium prices comes from the same misguided strategy. As statistical
physicists would have known, state variables such as a system’s temperature are not defined
outside of thermal equilibrium. The attempt of Walrasian theory to have agents trade only
at well-defined market prices and thereby preserve their wealth from the endowment to the
equilibrium point requires unrealistic assumptions about agents’ preferences (E. Smith and
Foley 2008). These difficulties also reveal the futility of policy based on the second fundamental
theorem of welfare economics (Foley 2010).
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positively-skewed and fat-tailed appearance of wage distributions, some authors
have characterized the wage distribution as an exponential distribution (e.g.
Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2000; Drăgulescu and Yakovenko 2001; Shaikh, Pa-
panikolaou, and Wiener 2014). The main benefit of exponential distributions
is their extreme parsimony, being defined by only one free parameter. This
parsimony comes at a price however, particularly if we are interested in a more
finely tuned analysis of the bottom rung of the labor market. The exponential
distribution predicts the highest frequency for wages just above 0, or any other
minimum wage level one cares to specify. While this dovetails with Classical
Political Economy ideas that wages are regulated by historically-specific levels
of subsistence (Schneider 2010), there is a non-negligible infra-modal part in
observed wage distributions for which the exponential model fails. The QRSE
model on the other hand accounts for this regularity by allowing for out-mobility
of workers from low-wage labor market segments.
The equilibrium concept employed in the econophysics literature is clearly
statistical, however the question of how the competitive behavior of workers
and wages mutually condition each other has not been investigated in a com-
prehensive way. Furthermore, some of the models in this literature draw direct
analogies with physical models at the expense of economic intuition. In an
analogy with the ideal gas law, agents are partitioned over “money” levels and
the mean energy constraint is justified by claiming that money is conserved in
exchange (Dragulescu and Yakovenko 2000; Drăgulescu and Yakovenko 2001;
Yakovenko 2013). A more economically motivated take on the exponential dis-
tribution of wages can be found in the ideas of statistical market-clearing (Foley
1996) and social scaling (Santos 2017), as well as in the segmentation hypothesis
of Schneider 2015.
The Smithian model presented in this paper does not draw on physics analo-
gies. Instead, it is rooted in the fundamental premises of economic theory that
agents are goal-oriented and that their social interaction produces results that
are not intended by any individual. The model closest to our own is discussed
in Toda 2011; Toda 2012. The author argues for a double-power law of labor
income distribution, which arises when the logarithm of wages is Laplace dis-
tributed. The Laplace is the stationary distribution of a stochastic process with
mean-reversion at a constant rate. This process corresponds to a labor market
where all workers independently of their current wages are subject to the same
competitive process. Our model directly specifies the constraints on the equi-
librium distribution rather than describing the underlying stochastic process.
While the stochastic differential model of the latter author describes the time
evolution of wages, it does not explicitly represent the interaction between the
workers’ actions and their wage outcomes as is done in our model.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has shown how measures of the competitiveness of labor markets
can be extracted from incomplete data. Social scientists are often confronted
23
with problems of this type if they want to make use of population survey and
census data. Cross-sectional information on outcome variables such as wages
and consumption is available, but the behaviors which are jointly determined
with these outcomes are usually not observed.
In this paper we have shown that the Smithian model of competition together
with the maximum entropy principle help to extract useful information from this
kind of data. The Smithian model was condensed to two limited assumptions
about the mutual dependence between wages and actions. Since actions are
not observed, the familiar estimation techniques of regression modeling did not
seem to be available. At this stage, the MaxEnt principle was used to infer the
least biased joint distribution of wages and actions that was still consistent with
the Smithian model. The resulting distributions left three degrees of freedom
undetermined. In a final stage, we estimated the most likely value of these
parameters by fitting the Smithian prediction to the observed wage distribution.
The fit of this model is remarkably good, particularly in light of its parsimonious
nature. We proposed that the two parameters (T, δ) constitute straightforward
measures of competition, whose values are reasonable for the labor market strata
investigated in this paper.
The QRSE model has a number of interesting applications in the field of
labor economics. Further work in this line of research includes exploring pos-
sible correlates of the measures of labor competition, as well as their evolution
over time. A large literature has been devoted to analyzing the evolution of
wage inequality in the US over the past decades, with a particular emphasis on
average wage differences between low- and high-skilled workers. Relatively little
attention has been devoted to the analysis of “residual” wage inequality, and the
Smithian model would allow the researcher to extract valuable behavioral infor-
mation from the residual data. Another extension would incorporate additional
information about social identity of the workers and its role in the competitive
process. If certain social groups are precluded from competing in more attractive
labor market segments to a greater extent than other groups, this information
could be incorporated as an additional constraint of the Smithian model. The
QRSE approach is a very general modeling framework that could in principle
extend to more complex scenarios, such as multinomial choices between more
than two alternative actions. Such a model could, for instance, be used to in-
vestigate the choice between different labor markets rather than being limited
to entry and exit decisions within the same labor market stratum.
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A Appendices
A.1 Mathematical Appendix
A.1.1 Analytical results
Relative Entropy as Approximation to the Multinomial Distribution
Consider the multinomial distribution (1), which gives the probability of a his-
togram n for given prior probabilities q. Finding the most probable realization
of a system described by the multinomial model requires maximizing (1), which
is equivalent to maximizing the monotonic transformation
ln(g(n;N,q)) = ln(N !) +
s∑
i=1
(niln(qi)− ln(ni!))
=
s∑
i=1
(ni
N
ln(N !) + niln(qi)− ln(ni!)
)
=
s∑
i=1
(piln(N !) + piNln(qi)− ln((piN))!)) (16)
where the second equality follows from the normalization constraint
∑s
i=1 ni =
N and the third equality replaces the absolute frequencies n with the relative
frequencies p. Finally we can make use of Sterling’s approximation for factorials
ln(x!) ≈ x ln(x)− x, which leads to quite accurate results for even moderately
large x. Approximating the factorial in (16) in this way, we can write
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ln(g(p;N,q)) ≈
s∑
i=1
(pi(Nln(N)−N)− piNln(piN) + piN + piNln(qi))
≈ −N
s∑
i=1
piln
(
pi
qi
)
(17)
Note that (17) is the negative relative entropy (the KL divergence) scaled by
the size of the system. For uniform prior probabilities qi = 1/s, the multinomial
(1) collapses to
g(n;N, 1/s) =
N !
n1! · · ·ns!
(
1
s
)N
(18)
In this case, the derivation is parallel to the above except that we are left
with the Shannon entropy (2) and an additive constant that can be dropped.
Maximum Entropy Program with Mean Constraint The Maximum En-
tropy program (3) can solved in part using the method of Lagrange multipliers.
For the problem with only a mean and normalization constraint, we write
L = −
∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(a,w)log(f(a,w)) dw − λ
(∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(a,w) dw − 1
)
− γ
(ˆ ∞
w=0
∑
a
f(a,w)w dw − w¯
) (19)
Since our objective is a sum of concave functions and therefore itself concave,
and the constraints are affine or convex, we know that any extremum will be a
global maximum. It is therefore sufficient to calculate the first order conditions
∂L
∂f(a,w) = 0 and solve for the conditional density f(a,w):
f(a,w) = e−(1+λ)−γw (20)
We can eliminate λ using constraint (4):
e−(1+λ) =
1∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
(1 + e−γw)
(21)
Plugging (21) back into the conditional density (20), we get in terms of γ:
f(a,w) =
e−γwˆ ∞
w=0
e−γw dw
(22)
Finally, we solve for γ using (5).
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Maximum Entropy Program with Smithian Constraints For computa-
tional ease, we simplify the MaxEnt program with the two Smithian constraints
(7) and (11) by absorbing (11) into the objective function. Rewriting the joint
distribution as the product f(a,w) = f(w)f(a|w), we can make use of the fact
that the entropy (2) is strongly additive (Kapur and Kesavan 1992):
S(f(a,w)) = −
∑
a
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(a,w)log(f(a,w)) dw
=
ˆ ∞
w=0
(
f(w)log(f(w))
∑
a
f(a|w)
)
dw −
ˆ ∞
w=0
(
f(w)
∑
a
f(a|w)log(f(a|w))
)
dw
= S(f(w)) +
ˆ ∞
w=0
(f(w)S(f(a|w))) dw (23)
where the last equality in (23) follows from the fact that
∑
a f(a|w) = 1.
S(f(a|w)) is the entropy of the action distribution conditional on wages:
S(f(a|w)) = −
(
e
1
T (w−µ)
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
log
(
e
1
T (w−µ)
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
)
+
1
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
log
(
1
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
))
(24)
We also have to rewrite the difference-in-mean constraint (7):
f(enter)E(w|enter)− f(exit)E(w|exit) ≤ δ (25)ˆ ∞
w=0
f(enter)f(w|enter)w dw −
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(exit)f(w|exit)w dw ≤ δ (26)
ˆ ∞
w=0
(f(w)f(enter|w)− f(w)f(exit|w))w dw ≤ δ (27)
ˆ ∞
w=0
(
e
1
T (w−µ)
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
− 1
1 + e
1
T (w−µ)
)
f(w)w dw ≤ δ (28)
ˆ ∞
w=0
tanh(
w − µ
2T
)f(w)w dw ≤ δ (29)
The entropy maximization program can then be written as
max
({f(w)≥0})
S(f(w)) +
ˆ ∞
w=0
(f(w)S(f(a|w))) dw (30)
subject to
ˆ ∞
w=0
f(w) dw = 1 (31)
ˆ ∞
w=0
tanh(
w − µ
2T
)f(w)w dw ≤ δ (32)
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Setting up a Lagrangian for this problem:
L = S(f(w)) +
ˆ ∞
w=0
(f(w)S(f(a|w))) dw − λ
(ˆ ∞
w=0
f(w) dw − 1
)
− β
(ˆ ∞
w=0
tanh(
w − µ
2T
)f(w)w dw − δ
) (33)
As above, we find the first order condition to solve for the marginal distri-
bution:
∂L
∂f(w)
= −log(f(w))− 1− λ+ S(f(a|w))− β
(
tanh(
w − µ
2T
)w
)
= 0 (34)
We again eliminate λ using the normalization constraint and write the pre-
dicted marginal wage distribution in terms of the multiplier β and the parame-
ters T and µ.
f(w) =
eS(f(a|w))e−β(tanh(
w−µ
2T )w)ˆ ∞
w=0
eS(f(a|w))e−β(tanh(
w−µ
2T )w) dw
(35)
A.1.2 Numerical calculations
The core estimation problem is the maximization of the posterior probability
distribution, using the QRSE likelihood. We choose the following priors:
pi(T ) = exp(0.1) pi(µ) = pi(β) = U(−4, 4)
By the Bayesian theorem, the posterior distribution is proportional to the
likelihood of the data times the prior distribution.
p(T, β, µ|w) ∝ e−NDKL(f(w)||fME(w;T,β,µ))pi(T )pi(β)pi(µ) (36)
The numerical calculations relied on open-source mathematical software.
Data handling was done using R Core Team 2013; Wickham 2011, while the
plots were created using Wickham 2009. Maximum a posteriori (MAP) esti-
mation was done using a two-step numerical optimization algorithm. First, the
approximate location of the parameters was estimated using the global opti-
mizer by Benham et al. 2017. The result was then used as the starting point of
a downhill simplex algorithm (Nelder and Mead 1965) as implemented in Nash
and Varadhan 2011.
A.2 Data source and construction
The data for this paper are drawn from the pooled 2007-2011 American Commu-
nity Survey (ACS) 6. The ACS replaces the decennial census as the main source
6Data and documentation were obtained from Ruggles et al. 2015
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of socioeconomic and housing information and is used by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau to generate sub-national and sub-state estimates. Similar to other large
scale social surveys, the ACS uses a complex stratified population sampling ap-
proach which requires the use of survey weights to “bring the characteristics of
the sample more into agreement with those of the full population.” (U.S. Census
Bureau 2014) In addition to the probability of selection in the stratified sam-
pling design, the survey weights also incorporate post-stratification with respect
to independent population estimates from demographic data on births, deaths
and net migration. For the purposes of this study, the survey weights were
summed within histogram cells to obtain the estimated population frequency
distribution. However, the number of observations was used instead of the sum
of weights in calculating the likelihood.
While the ACS aims to represent the entire population, there is great vari-
ation in labor market participation. In particular, a significant share of the
population is not expected to participate in labor competition due to their age.
Second, a smaller share of the population derives their income primarily from
sources other than the sale of their labor power. In this study, the approach
taken is to restrict the sample to respondents aged 18-64 who report positive
weekly wage and salary earnings. Respondents earning 4’000 USD or more per
week are also excluded, as are those earning 200’000 USD per year or more.
This removes respondents with annual earnings at or above the top-coded value
imposed by the U.S. Census Bureau to preserve anonymity. In addition to the
technical issue of top-coding, we argue that earnings above these levels are likely
to be contaminated by profit-like incomes such as those of corporate executives
or directors of large institutions.
Additional adjustments to the sample are necessary because of unknown al-
terations to the original data. For confidentiality reasons, the general public
has access only to a modified subset of about 1.3 million housing units. Modifi-
cations include top-coding of incomes, perturbation of age and household size,
and some other permutations. Furthermore, values for some relevant variables
may be imputed based on logical considerations or with a hot-deck algorithm.
Since the data are not sufficient to distinguish between logical and random im-
putations, we include only respondents with unaltered values for their wages.
The outcome variable in this study are weekly wages, constructed by dividing
annual gross (pre-tax) wage and salary income by the number of weeks worked
during the previous year. Both variables refer to the 12 months before the
survey was taken. Since the number of weeks worked is given in intervals,
we follow (Borjas 2014) in imputing the relevant averages from earlier surveys
where detailed information is available. In particular, we assign 7.4 weeks to
those with 1-13 weeks worked, 21.3 to those with 14-26 weeks, 33.1 to those with
27-39 weeks, 42.4 to those with 40-47 weeks, 48.2 to those with 48-49 weeks and
51.9 to those with 50-52 weeks.
In this study, we make the strong assumption that worker types are primar-
ily distinguished by labor market experience. This stratification of the labor
market takes account of the tendency of wages to increase with the acquisition
of skills in the form of on-the-job learning, as well as pay progression with age
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and job tenure. We follow Borjas 2014 in defining experience cells in terms
of the estimated years on the labor market. Each respondent in our American
Community Survey sample is classified according to the difference between their
age and the year they achieved their highest level of education. Labor market
entry is estimated to take place at 17 years for high school dropouts, 19 years
for high school graduates, 21 years for those with some college but no degree,
23 years for college graduates and 24 years for those with more than a college
degree. We then group all workers with between 1 and 40 years of experience
into 5-year experience cells. This is a rather coarse-grained stratification of la-
bor markets, but preliminary investigation suggests that the results are fairly
robust to the particular decomposition of the sample.
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